Dhaka-Beijing bhai bhai? India may need more stick-less carrot approach

As someone who has made a mark through relentless networking, it is unlikely that Bangladesh’s chief adviser Muhammad Yunus was unaware of the ramifications of his remarks on his return from China. His observation of India’s north-eastern states being landlocked and Bangladesh having the “ownership of the ocean” could have been viewed as a clumsy expression of Indo-Bangladesh synergies. However, after his narration of the benefits that could accrue to China by incorporating the Seven Sisters into its backyard, Yunus left no room for ambiguity. Having failed to cut through India’s diplomatic frostiness since the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina’s govt in August last year, the interim administration has chosen to flaunt its proximity to Beijing. This ostentatious display of China’s protective umbrella is also being viewed as an assertion of national self-esteem in some quarters of Bangladesh, an impression bolstered by Friday’s bilateral meeting between Yunus and Narendra Modi in Bangkok. That Yunus had one eye on his domestic constituency is undeniable. Over the past fortnight, following the deterioration of law and order, and rising tensions among the different forces that had momentarily united to oust the Awami League govt, Bangladesh has been gripped by rumours of an imminent army takeover. On Feb 25, army chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman went public with finger-wagging advice to the interim administration to stop the in-fighting and get its act together. That is easier said than done. It is becoming clear that Yunus is disproportionately dependent on support from the hotheads who are both a part of his govt and have also formed a political party of their own. Perceived as being Islamist-friendly, these ‘student’ activists have led the campaign to erase symbols of the 1971 liberation struggle and, simultaneously, create an Islamist Second Republic centred on the uprising of 2024. Predictably, these ideological contortions have fed into a virulently anti-India narrative. Although the widespread attacks on the country’s Hindu minority were sought to be explained as targeting supporters of the former regime, the stormtroopers of the interim regime had little time for pluralist niceties. The continuing harassment and incarceration of Swami Chinmaya Prabhu on charges of sedition are aimed at sending a message to Hindus to keep out of public life or face the consequences. The former ISKCON functionary is viewed as a public enemy by the Islamists because his message to the Hindus is to stay and fight in Bangladesh, rather than depart to India.Predictably, the bid to recreate Bangladesh in the image of those who were on the losing side in 1971 hasn’t gone down too well among, say, the Bangladesh National Party. Apart from its own links with the liberation war, the BNP wants a quick election because it senses an imminent victory. However, the student radicals first want fundamental ‘reforms’, including a new Constitution. Even on the question of ‘inclusive elections’, the radicals want an outright ban on the Awami League, while others are content with disqualification of individuals facing serious criminal charges. The tussle between these different political impulses suits Yunus. The chief adviser has not discouraged talk that he should be at the helm for the next decade. India has responded to the convulsions in Bangladesh with a carrot-and-stick approach. Trade and business, including the supply of food and consumer goods on which Bangladesh is extremely dependent, has continued with minor hiccups. Nor has there been any disruption in the supplies of yarn to feed Bangladesh’s garments industry. India has, however, cut back on visas, including medical visas, to Bangladeshis. Although some Bangladeshis maintain the fiction that India’s new visa regime has crippled Kolkata’s economy, it is the small traders—such as Jamdani sari sellers—and Bangladeshis needing to come to India to secure third country visas who have been badly affected. Disruptions to the Indian economy would have been profound had the use of the Chittagong by businesses in the Seven Sisters been secured under Hasina.For Delhi, the challenges facing its relationship with Dhaka are political and strategic. Since India has a larger-than-life profile in Bangladesh, each step it takes is scrutinised and over-interpreted. At present, India wants to avoid doing anything beyond the bare minimum. However, the large-scale re-entry of Pakistan to Bangladesh and Yunus’ invitation to China to see Bangladesh as an extension of its domestic market has put national security on top of India’s concerns. Ideally, India should wait to develop a relationship with an elected govt in Bangladesh. However, since there are no indications that the interim administration sees the return to democracy as a priority, India may well be forced to act before hostile forces start using Bangladesh as a launch pad for anti-India operations. A permanent solution to the security of the Chicken’s Neck in Siliguri is an obvious priority that must not wait for a friendly dispensation in Dhaka.Under Hasina, India was comforted by the knowledge that at least on the question of national security, both countries were on the same page. Since Dhaka’s cooperation is no longer assured, safeguarding eastern India involves a search for alternative approaches. Diplomacy must be the preferred option. But it must be made clear to the other side that it isn’t the only option.