Will Pak respond like a ‘rational actor’ or throw caution to the wind?

medium120971575After the terrorist attack in Mumbai, IAF had offered govt options for an immediate air power-led response against terror infra in PoJK. That didn’t happen given the escalatory dynamics of the time despite voices from within the strategic establishment suggesting that there was a window for limited military action .Indian army’s cross-border strikes in 2016 and Balakot strike of 2019 were baby steps taken by a strategic establishment attempting to infuse a retaliatory paradigm in India’s response to terrorism. Though these responses did meaningfully contribute to deterrence for a few years, India was forced to go back to the drawing board after the Pahalgam attacks.As IAF Rafale jets launched their Hammer & Scalp missiles between 1.00-1.30am late Tuesday night against nine terrorist targets and infra inside PoJK and across IB, it’s important to look at the larger picture of deterrence and punitive action. Some immediate issues merit reflection as we evaluate India’s measured, calibrated, preemptive, non-escalatory and deterrence-driven retaliatory strikes.* Importance of meticulous planning and secrecy of plans. In an era of stare capability by space-based surveillance assets, social media leaks, attempts by TV to ‘war game’ scenarios and predict outcomes, it’s evident strategic leadership’s ability to stay ahead of adversaries and keep them guessing remains an important element of contemporary warfare.* By not resorting to immediate punitive strikes and instead building pressure through diplomacy and non-military actions, India’s armed forces seem to have been given adequate ‘breathing’ time to launch an effective but restrained op, helped by quality intelligence.* Operation Sindoor was declared an integrated and joint operation with significant preliminary visibility accorded to the air strikes. Though Balakot air strikes were a strategic success and imposed a six-year-long deterrence on Pak’s jihadi establishment, there were several lessons that emerged. It is to IAF’s credit that it has trained hard in the years since to adapt to the paradigm of limited wars and counterterror ops.* Rafale’s induction has been a game changer that could play out further when — not if — Pakistan launches its retaliatory action. Should Pakistan suffer even modest losses in such an action, it would be the surest way down the path of de-escalation.* Comparative quality of the politico-military synergy on both sides post Pahalgam plays a key role. Installing ISI chief as Pak NSA and the knee-jerk nuclear rhetoric reflect the chaos that set in after India’s non-military measures. On the Indian side, there seems to have been a calm process-driven approach with clear political directives and some political posturing that conveyed intent but had to be matched with tangible action.* What would have taken many analysts by surprise is the continued faith India’s strategic establishment reposed in offensive air power to offer counterterror options. This is a major strategic hurdle crossed. India in the past has always considered offensive air power as an escalatory element in sub-conventional or short-of-war situations.* The point to reflect on is whether Pakistan follows the ‘rational actor’ model in its response, or will it throw caution to the wind to conduct widespread air strikes and indiscriminate artillery shelling against Indian military and civilian targets?* Given the enormous pressure on Pak military to respond, the most likely ‘calibrated’ response may reference the model adopted during PAF’s operations after Balakot (Operation Swift Retort) with symbolic attacks on military targets along LoC attempted. With India’s layered air defence ecosystem having learnt its lessons after Operation Swift Retort, such ops are doomed to fail.Moot point is that notwithstanding General Munir’s tag as a ‘jihadi’ and war-mongering general, there are bound to be sane voices from all three services, particularly from within Pak air force and navy that eschew expansion of conflict against India.* The world will now ask if India has shed its cloak as a diffident power and will emerge as a more assertive ‘rising power’. Is this also an indirect signal to Beijing to recalibrate its relationship with India? Wishful thinking, but could the current situation also usher in the possibility that sections of Pak civil society realise the futility of buckling to their army and jihadi establishment?Finally, what India’s strategic establishment must heed loud and clear is that credible hard power to respond to external threats is a non-negotiable instrument of statecraft. The current crisis deals with an adversary dwarfed in size and capability. The same is not true elsewhere.The writer is a retired Air Vice MarshalTOI+ complete coverage of Operation Sindoor here