Will appeasing Trump really help India’s global rise?

Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency is widely perceived as exemplifying virulent American carnage. Often without discipline but with ruthlessness all the same, Trump is viewed as bludgeoning the idea of America both at home and abroad. Despite New Delhi’s feigned optimism in these circumstances, US-Indian relations have been disturbed as well. For a quarter century now, bilateral ties between Washington and New Delhi have been steadily improving, as successive US administrations — including Trump’s during his first term—wooed India because of the competition with China.
Trump’s reappearance has altered this traditional strategy in dramatic ways. His contempt for the liberal order is transparent, but it is also accompanied by atavistic attempts at territorial expansionism, the imposition of ‘reciprocal’ tariffs on all US trading partners, and confrontations with many allies and adversaries alike. In this environment, India has understandably sought to protect its past bilateral gains by mollifying Trump through conciliatory diplomacy. PM Modi and his senior aides rushed to Washington to meet the president in a highly choreographed display of bonhomie, attempting to reassure him that unlike many of his other national targets, India is neither a free-loading ally nor a foe and, hence, would be a partner in his campaign to ‘Make America Great Again’. Modi’s gushing praise of Trump as a peacemaker and even his cheesy public endorsement of MAGA were all intended to deflect the ravages of Trump’s new policies.
These policy changes matter for India. In a striking departure from the past, Trump’s behaviour has underscored that he does not think much of India in the context of US-China rivalry. His administration may have other ideas—which could surface in time—but for the moment, Trump is obsessed with correcting America’s trade deficits to the neglect of much else, which makes India, the “tariff king,” a juicy target.
Recognising this priority, Indian policymakers have moved in several directions: feverishly seeking to conclude an interim trade agreement that would hopefully remove Trump’s tariffs on India; offering assurances that India’s problematic nuclear liability law will be amended to permit US nuclear reactor exports; and attempting to resolve the longstanding bilateral dispute about the fate of Lincoln House, the former US consulate in Mumbai, to Washington’s satisfaction.
These solutions and others are driven by the imperative of protecting India’s relationship with the US in the changed circumstances. Accordingly, the Modi govt desires an end to the US trade tensions against India, a real US commitment to implementing the TRUST (Transforming the Relationship Utilising Strategic Technology) initiative, and clarity about the larger US policy toward China beyond trade, especially as it pertains to preventing the rise of threatening hegemonic powers in Asia. Success along these three dimensions is vital both for India’s continued economic growth and for geopolitical assurance in the face of India’s continuing rivalry with China.
That Washington now shows little interest in protecting the international order also poses other challenges to New Delhi. Although Indian leaders sometimes discount the value of the existing system—because it has not fully accommodated India’s status claims—they have moved quickly to hedge against the uncertainties. This effort includes concluding a free-trade agreement with the European Union and strengthening the bonds with key European partners more generally; slowly resuscitating ties with China; preserving India’s traditional relationship with Russia; and strengthening links with Australia, Israel, Japan, the wealthy Arab states, and the Global South.

While Indian policymakers are astute enough to recognise that Trump’s disruptive policies could impose serious costs on New Delhi, they have nonetheless publicly touted the benefits of his disorder while seeking to exploit its opportunities. For example, the administration’s dismantling of the US bureaucracy and its aversion to export controls have created new openings for India to acquire controlled technologies that were previously unavailable. Similarly, New Delhi views Washington’s attacks on its alliances and on international institutions as expanding the prospects for the emergence of multipolarity and, by implication, creating new space for India’s arrival as a great power.
But this expectation is illusory. The destruction of the liberal international order does not presage multipolarity but rather consolidates the bipolarity that will subsist amid the increasing entropy in global politics. Trump’s policies will enhance the conditions for China’s continued rise, increase its legitimacy as a responsible power, and—by burdening India’s economic growth and damaging US alliances along the way—undermine the countervailing forces that could coherently resist Beijing when needed.
As a result, China will join the US as a true great power, and despite not matching up fully, both nations will stand apart from the rest of the international system in terms of sheer capabilities for several decades to come. Whether this outcome really serves India’s interests remains to be seen, and even if New Delhi opportunistically secures some tactical gains because of Trump’s turbulence, the strategic losses it suffers could be enduring.